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By Trevor |
"Risk" as a conceptual approach for much of the research on health has come under attack from many sides. Risk is everywhere and nowhere, it seems. When it comes to gay men's health, gay men's sexual risk practices have particularly been scrutinized by researchers who wish to stop gay men from doing such naughty things as having sex without condoms. Many have suggested that rethinking "risk" (traditionally conceived of through the lens of an isolated rational actor making complex cost-benefit analyses aimed at maximizing returns and minimizing harm for him/herself) as a concept is a necessary step towards creating a more effective / ethical / social public health.
As I was reading for my class today on the Sociology of Law, I came across this very interesting distinction between "risk" and "uncertainty" that gets made in the literature on organizational behavior:
"On the whole, then, high-technology start-up financing poses challenges not only of risk but also of uncertainty. Although lay parlance often employs these terms interchangeably, the organizational decision-making literature uses them to describe two distinct conditions. Under conditions of "risk," decision-makers may not be able to predict the future deterministically, but at least they can describe it probabilistically: with a little effort, individuals can identify the full range of options and outcomes, and they can determine roughly how likely it is that any given option will produce any particular outcome. Consequently, despite the presence of risk, decision-makers can still make rational choices based on expected-value calculations, and markets can still produce efficient coordination based on contingent-claims contracts.
Uncertainty, on the other hand, arises when decision-makers cannot determine either (1) the full menu of alterative behavioral options or (2) the relative probability of alternative possible outcomes. Unlike risk, uncertainty is deeply incompatible with the neoclassical model of fully rational decision-making. Instead of producing a careful expected-utility analysis of all lines of action, conditions of uncertainty tend to produce "boundedly rational" decision strategies, involving "good enough" choices, gut feelings, and rules of thumb. At a more macroscopic level, uncertainty elevates transaction costs and exacerbates intra-organization strains and power struggles. Consequently, unresolved uncertainty poses a fundamental cognitive and organizational obstacle to the formation and maintenance of stable markets for high-technology start-up capital."
-- Suchman, M. & Cahill, M. (1996) "The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley." Law & Social Inquiry, 21(3): 679-712.
So my questions of the day: What would it mean to reconceptualize men's safer sex practices as enacted in an environment of uncertainty -- rather than in an environment of risk? Is "risk" really the appropriate concept for understanding these complicated, negotiated practices?
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My re-conceptualization of MSM or gay men's safer sex practices is to accept the fact that the longstanding "use a condom every time" model of HIV prevention has resulted in a much lower HIV infection rate for gay men practicing anal sex, but it will not drive the rate of HIV infections any lower than what we've seen over the last decade. Once you accept that fact, it is time to start looking for additional methods to drive the infection rate lower.
Careful epidemiologists, including those who study HIV transmission, have always included the disclaimer that all of the "risk" odds ratios they calculate are based ONLY on past data because there is always the "uncertainty" that future epidemiological data may be different due to "unpredictable" reasons, such as bareback anal sex becoming more culturally acceptable between partners who can't be absolutely sure of the other person's HIV status. (This unpredictable change actually happened in the 1990s, especially after the unpredictable discovery of effective HIV drug therapies.)
Obviously, HIV prevention specialists can't plan for all unpredictable changes, but they can try to intentionally cause a predictable change that will hopefully lower the HIV infection rate. I say "hopefully" because the effectiveness of any HIV prevention program can only be measured in the real world, after the fact. It can't be fully predicted in advance.
Note that driving the HIV infection rate lower is NOT necessarily changing the "risk" or "uncertainty." The risk of acquiring HIV from a single instance of unprotected anal sex with an HIV infected partner may stay the same even with a lower HIV infection rate. Likewise, there is always the uncertainty that other unpredicted things may happen, resulting in a higher or lower infection rate.
The significant, but limited, success of the "condom code" is why I have been so supportive of developing new technologies for gay anal sex that could lower the "risk" of HIV transmission, such as redesigning the female condom for gay anal sex or designing rectal microbicide lubes and safer PEG-ES enemas or douches for washing out before and after anal sex. I am also still supportive of non-technological approaches, such as the group "empowerment" programs that were tried in the 1990s, but so far programs based on behavioral psychology have not proved to be easy to implement, or cost effective enough to be adequately funded by social welfare organizations. However, I am always open to the discovery of better social methods to lower the HIV infection rate in the future.
This is the same bounded rationality upon which I based my post on "Giving neg men time and space to learn", and the HIV Australia article "Solutions to Stigma", and the Criminalisation Monograph article "The impact of criminalisation on community-based HIV prevention". It's not just a matter of swapping out risk and speaking about uncertainty instead -- it's also good to learn a bit about the cognitive processes people use in 'making decisions (sic) under uncertainty'. The picture gets REALLY interesting when you start to think how those processes are embedded in and informed by social practices.
For instance, Kahneman and Tversky describe an 'availability heuristic' in which risk of an outcome is judged roughly from how often and how vividly it has been mentioned in recent memory of the person doing the judgment -- how easily available or 'front of mind' it is.
So far, so much psychobabble, until you think about how the stigma against barebacking and crystal tends to organise people into social groups that are pretty much uniformly for or against bb/tina. I think what you get then is an 'echo chamber' effect, where the social structure ensures confirmation and the group moves to an extreme for/against.
Unfortunately, at this point I'm right up against the 'social network intervention' stuff that I protested against on the GMHS Ning. I think the difference is that they classified individuals as high/low risk, whereas I'm thinking about the internal diversity of their discourse on sex, pleasure and safety.
Is it really bounded rationality? "Gut feelings" and "rules of thumb" don't sound like it...
"Rules of thumb" = heuristics. Where are you quoting "gut feelings" from?